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State v. Andujar:

WHY

MEANINGFUL
REFORM

IS NEEDED
By Natalie Aguilar

State v. Andujar: Batson v. Kentucky Evaded

In State v. Andujar, the prosecution issued a challenge for cause
against potential juror F.G.16 The state argued that, “F.G.’s background,
associations and knowledge of the criminal justice system were
problematic,” and also suggested that F.G. had been evasive.17 The
trial judge rejected the challenge and found F.G would make a fair
and impartial juror.18 The State then chose to run a criminal history
check on F.G. and found that he had an outstanding warrant.19 He was
arrested, though his charges were later dropped.20 The State did not
investigate any other juror to this extent.21

The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees the right to
a trial by a fair and impartial jury.4 The criminal justice system has
designed two stages to ensure fairness and impartiality among jury
selection. Firstly, the pool from which juries are drawn from must
be representative of the community.5 Secondly, the jury selection
process identifies and removes jurors who cannot be impartial.6 Both
attorneys and judges interview potential jurors to ensure impartiality.7

The trial court in the Andujar case never engaged in a Batson analysis:
after the court rejected the for-cause challenge, the State did not raise
a peremptory challenge. Instead, the State ran a “criminal history check
on F.G… effectively evad[ing] any Batson…analysis.”22

On July 13, 2021, the New Jersey State Supreme Court affirmed the
appellate court’s decision to reverse Edwin Andujar’s conviction of
first-degree murder and weapons offenses.1 The Court held that the
State violated Andujar’s right to a fair trial because the State’s racial
discrimination infected the jury selection process.2 This case gave the
New Jersey Supreme Court the opportunity to discuss the critical role
of jury selection and to consider the additional measures needed to
prevent discrimination in jury selection.3

Attorneys have two different ways to exclude prospective jurors
during the jury selection process.8 Counsel can challenge for cause,
which requires convincing a judge that a prospective juror has a bias
that precludes impartiality.9 Or, attorneys can issue a peremptory
challenge, which allows lawyers to exclude jurors without explanation
or evidence of impartiality.10
Usually, if a trial court rejects a challenge for cause, then the attorney
who raised the for-cause challenge will issue a peremptory challenge,
which can trigger a Batson analysis.11 A Batson challenge is made
by the party who believes the peremptory challenge is being used
to exclude a juror on the basis of race.12 A Batson challenge includes
a three-step analysis, where the party contesting the peremptory
challenge must show that the peremptory challenge was intentionally
exercised on the basis of race or ethnicity.13 The burden then shifts to
the party issuing the peremptory challenge to provide a race-neutral
explanation supporting the peremptory challenge.14 Finally, the trial
judge decides whether the proffered explanations are genuine and
reasonable grounds to remove the juror or simply baseless excuses
hiding discriminatory motivations.15

The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the appellate division’s
decision to reverse Andujar’s conviction. The Court also held that,
for future cases, “any party seeking to run a criminal history check
on a prospective juror must present a reasonable, individualized,
good-faith basis for the request and obtain permission from the trial
judge.”23 A good-faith basis request requires the party to believe that
a record check might reveal “pertinent information unlikely to be
uncovered through the ordinary voir dire process.”24 “Mere hunches”
are not enough to justify a criminal record check.25
As indicated above, this new “standard,” which determines whether
a criminal history check was appropriate, was not met in Andujar’s
case.26 In Andujar, the State neither presented a request—
individualized, based in good faith or otherwise—nor obtained the
judge’s permission to run a background check on F.G.27 Instead, the
State ran the background check after the judge determined F.G.
would make a fair and impartial juror.28 Based upon the prosecution’s
disregard of this standard, the Court concluded that F.G.’s removal
may have stemmed from the State’s implicit bias.29

continued on next page >
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Batson’s Failures

The Batson analysis explicitly applies to
only peremptory challenges. Therefore,
courts have not extended the doctrine to
allegations of discrimination to for cause
challenges.30 Courts have held that there is
no legal basis to apply the Batson analysis
to for challenge.31 The courts reason that
for-cause challenges already require the
party issuing the challenge to provide a raceneutral reason.32 Therefore, there is no need
to apply Batson because the Batson analysis
would accomplish the same thing: require
the issuing party to provide a race-neutral
reason.33 However, this disregards the ease
in which race-neutral justifications are easily
offered and accepted.34
Surprisingly, in the Andujar case, the state
supreme court appears to imply that
the Batson analysis applies to for-cause
challenges as well.35 The Court accepted
that, “implicit bias is no less real and no less
problematic than intentional bias. The effects
of both can be the same: a jury selection
process that is tainted by discrimination.”36
The Batson analysis is meant to address
racial discrimination in courts. However,
legal scholars view the analysis to be
ineffective.37 An important reason the
Batson challenge often fails is that it only
addresses purposeful racial discrimination in
jury selection. It does not address or combat
implicit bias.38 Therefore, the flaws in the
Batson analysis allow for the “ease with
which ‘race-neutral’ reasons are accepted
by judges and the failure to account for the
nuances of racial discrimination and bias.”39

Reform sought

peremptory challenge.44 In other words, the
court no longer needs to inquire whether
the prosecutor intentionally removed a
potential juror on the basis of race. Instead,
the court applies this objective standard to
determine if the prosecutor acted in a racially
discriminatory manner.
“The statute also provides a list of purported
reasons, which are presumptively invalid,
for striking a juror: (i) having prior conduct
with law enforcement;…(iii) having a close
relationship with people who have been
stopped, arrested, or convicted of a crime;…
(iv) living in a high-crime neighborhood.”45
In State v. Jefferson,46 the Washington
Supreme Court defined the objective
observer standard, “based on the average,
reasonable person—defined here as a person
who is aware of the history of explicit race
discrimination in America and aware of how
that impacts our current decision-making
in nonexplicit, or implicit, unstated, ways.”47
“By moving the inquiry into how an objective
observer would perceive the juror’s removal,
rather than probing a prosecutor’s mind for
overt racial animus, the test more effectively
deals with the issue of implicit bias.”48
Ideally, a judge who imposes this “objective
observer standard” will be able to rule on
a Batson challenge impartially, detached
from her personal feelings or opinions.
But, how realistic is an objective standard,
especially when this standard hinges on
the assumption that the judge making
the decisions is an objective ruler? What is
to secure the “objective standard” from a
judge’s own implicit biases?

Other states have recognized the effect of
implicit bias upon jury selection and have
accordingly revised the Batson analysis.
For example, Washington state attempted
to address Batson’s failures,40 by passing a
statute41 that modified the Batson analysis.42
The statute removed the purposeful
discrimination requirement from the Batson
analysis and instead imposed an objective
view inquiry.43

While this author is glad that the courts
have acknowledged the pervasive failure
of Batson, she is cautious to declare this
reform as a complete fix to the problem.
However, Washington has taken a step in
the right direction to address implicit bias in
jury selection. And now that New Jersey has
acknowledged the real harm implicit bias
creates, New Jersey needs to take real steps
in addressing the problem as well.

Instead of inquiring whether the prosecutor
was motivated by racial animus, Washington
state implemented the “objective observer
test.” This test asks whether an average,
reasonable person could view race or
ethnicity as a motivator in issuing the

A defendant’s right to a fair and impartial
jury is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
of the Constitution and needs to be better
protected. Prosecutors have constantly
violated that right by removing potential
diverse jurors for no reason other than racial
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bias. Too often, the explanations offered in
for-cause challenges and peremptory strikes
are justifications that hide implicit or blatant
racial biases.
While the Washington Batson reform does
not explicitly involve for-cause challenges,
for-cause challenges can also benefit from
the same type of reform.49 The Batson
reform effectively deals with implicit bias by
no longer requiring courts to find that the
prosecutor had purposeful bias in removing a
juror for a Batson challenge to succeed. The
reform removes the subjective inquiry into
the prosecutor’s mind, and instead analyzes
the reasoning offered for a peremptory strike
under an objective standard. Thus, when the
judge decides whether a for cause challenge
was made for race neutral reasons or for
racially discriminatory reasons, the judge
no longer has to worry about the subjective
intent of the prosecutor.
Since the state supreme court in the Andujar
case has likely expanded the application
of Batson to for-cause challenges, if New
Jersey would apply the Washington-type of
reform, the reformed analysis would most
likely apply to for-cause challenges as well.
While eliminating all bias from courts may be
impossible, the New Jersey judicial system
can continue to address bias by reforming its
Batson analysis and protecting defendants’
6th Amendment rights.50
Diversity in a jury pool is essential to a
defendant’s right to an impartial and fair trial.
Diversity in the jury pool is needed to provide
for diversity of thought, experience and
socio-economic background. Studies have
proven that diverse juries “deliberate longer,
more thoroughly evaluate the evidence and
are less likely to have a presumption of
guilt.”51 Instead of removing diverse jurors
from the jury pool, the criminal system needs
to ensure the diversity of juries, thereby
increasing the probability of a fair and
impartial trial.
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EVICTION SEALING
By Danielle DalPorto and Makela Hayford
Evictions do not tell a tenant’s full story, or necessarily predict whether a
potential tenant is likely to default on her rent. Yet landlords often search for
eviction filings and judgments in making decisions about whether to rent to
prospective tenants. Eviction sealing is a legal mechanism that may provide
relief to those who have eviction filings or judgments on their record. It involves
the removal of an eviction record on file with the court. This simple removal
provides one less barrier to those seeking housing, a basic human need.
Few cities in the United States offer tenants the opportunity to seal their evictions. While Ohio
does not create a right for eviction sealing, Cleveland’s housing court offers tenants limited
eviction sealing. In 2018, Housing Court Judge Ronald O’Leary, a Republican appointee, established
Cleveland’s formal eviction-sealing rule.1 Currently, there are four potential options for a tenant to
seal an eviction:
a) T he tenant defeats eviction or the Court dismisses the case;
b) T he landlord dismisses the case before adjudication;
c) By written agreement of the landlord to seal the record; or
d) T he landlord prevails and the tenant remains eviction-free for five years, and extenuating
circumstances brought about the eviction, and at least five years have passed since the
landlord prevailed on the possession claim.2
Regardless of the sealing outcome, however, tenants must disclose prior evictions or filings if
asked by prospective landlords.3
Although Cleveland Housing Court gives tenants the opportunity to seal their eviction records,
the authors still find the existing eviction-sealing rule limiting and that it rules out a significant
number of tenants. Viewing Cleveland’s eviction-sealing rule from a critical perspective,
the authors conclude that while sealing evictions to destigmatize individuals who have
experienced eviction is a step in the right direction, lawmakers or judges acting in this capacity
should amend the rule to broaden the population of individuals who may leverage it. This
continued on next page >
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